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I. Introduction
This Note contemplates marital restrictions in wills and trusts and
illustrates that it is still possible for the testator to continue to discriminate
through use of a basic right: The right to devise his property through the use of
testamentary instruments. This discussion is essential to dismantling the
J.D. Candidate, 2008, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This Note is dedicated to my
mother, late father, and their beautiful marriage of thirty years. I thank God for the gifts He has given me, my
father for his inspiration, and my mother for all her love and support. Additionally, I must thank Professor
Brown for her invaluable guidance and insight throughout this arduous process.
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perpetuation of prejudicial attitudes, particularly within the family unit. This
Note will argue that clauses restricting marriage in any manner should be
considered as operating "in terrorem,"' as they are unreasonable, coercive
restraints, and thus, should be held invalid.
It is virtually undisputed that marriage2 is the most intimate relationship
a couple can enjoy. In the American tradition, this act has been deemed the most
sacred and emotionally invested union of two individuals; consequently, the right
to marry has become fundamental.3 The freedom to marry is recognized and
understood as a vital personal right essential to one's pursuit of happiness,
4
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.5 It is good
public policy to promote the solidity of a marriage and to regard its dissolution as
6unattractive. Without marriage, there are no family units, and without family
units, there is no legitimate procreation; the marriage of two people is deemed
fundamental to humanity's "very existence and survival.
7
In the United States, however, during the dark era of slavery and spilling
over into the post-Civil Rights period of the late 1950's and 1960's, laws
prohibiting interracial marriage 8 were regularly upheld.9  In pre-civil war
America, it was legal for states to restrict marriages between black slaves and
free whites.10 It was also common for states to pass legislation that prohibited
I See infra note 139 (discussing the concept of an "in terrorem" clause).
2 This Note shall focus on heterosexual couples and marriage, though the ideas set forth in this piece
can be applied to homosexual couples as well.
3 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is part of one's
fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause). See also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival.") (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness.").
5 See id. ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted
by invidious racial discriminations.").
6 See, e.g., In re Peterson's Estate, 365 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1961) ("It is the policy of the law to
encourage the permanency and continuity of a marriage and to took with disfavor upon its dissolution."); see
also Bd. of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Ky. 1964) ("It is accepted, of course, that marriage is
favored by public policy."); Githens v. Githens, 78 Colo. 102, 105 (1925) ("The states of the Union generally
encourage the permanency and continuity of the marital relation. They look with disfavor upon divorces.").
7 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
8 Interracial marriage will also be referred to by the legal term "miscegenation." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1019 (8th ed. 2004) (defining miscegenation as "[a] marriage between persons of different races,
formerly considered illegal in some jurisdictions").
9 Numerous states propagated legislation in order to prevent the intermingling of Caucasian blood
with that of any other race-particularly that of African-Americans. States such as Delaware, Georgia,
Virginia, and California all had anti-miscegenation statutes for a majority of their history. See PAUL SPtKARD,
MIXED BLOOD: INTERMARRIAGE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY IN TWENTIErH-CENTURY AMERICA 374 (The
University of Wisconsin Press 1989) (describing state laws forbidding interracial marriage).
ia See WERNER SOLLORS, INTERRACIALiSM: BLACK-WHrDE INTERMARRIAGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY,
LxrERATURE AND LAW 146 (Oxford University Press 2000) (describing laws that once prevented enslaved
blacks and free whites from marrying); see also RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE
REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 19-20 (University of Chicago Press 2001) (describing laws forbidding
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intermarriage between indentured servants and black slaves." Even during and
after Reconstruction, laws forbidding 'Negros' to marry Caucasians were
widespread. It was not until Loving v. Virginia12 in 1967 that America was
forced to recognize miscegenation. Scholar Rachel Moran eloquently stated that
"Loving made clear that public officials could not reform decisions about
romance, even racist ones, because of Americans' fundamental freedom to make
sexual and marital choices for themselves."'
3
Nevertheless, states still tried to interfere with martial relationships. In
Zablocki v. Redhail,14 a father was refused a marriage license because he owed
child support. The Supreme Court held that no state could compel state approval
of a marriage based on a parents' child support status (paid or unpaid).' 5 The
Court further narrowed states' abilities to interfere with marriage, holding that a
state statute which "directly and substantially interferes with the decision to
marry"16 must be supported by important state interests and closely tailored to
effectuate those interests. 17 Zablocki virtually eliminated the states' ability to
control marriage.
Even so, though states can no longer limit the choice to marry a person
of another race, such a decision is still subject to private interference. Private
interference may not be surprising, but court enforcement of racist motives is.
Testators can, and do, condition inheritance on marriage to those within their
race, ethnicity, or religion. There are those who, even on their deathbed, would
try to remove any possibility that color could infiltrate their family ranks. By
restricting an heir's ability to take a share in the testator's estate, that testator
may influence an heir's decision to marry a certain "undesirable" person by
conditioning bequests of property.
interracial marriage).
1 See SPIKARD, supra note 9, at 374 (describing state laws prohibiting or disfavoring marriage
between enslaved blacks and indentured servants); see also EDWARD BYRON REUTER, RACE MIXTURE:
STUDIES IN INTERMARRIAGE AND MISCEGENATION 78 (1931) (explaining that if a slave and an indentured
servant married, the indentured servant would become a slave and their offspring would be slaves for the first
thirty years of their lives).
12 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But see DORRIS Y. WlINSON, BLACK MALE/WHITE
FEMALE: PERSPECTIVES ON INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE AND COURTSHIP 5 (1975) (explaining that Alabama did
not remove its anti-miscegenation statutes until 2000).
13 MORAN, supra note 10, at 111.
14 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 378 (1978).
15 Id. at 389 ("This 'collection device' rationale cannot justify the statute's broad infringement on the
right to marry.").
16 Id. at 396.
17 See G.G. v. R.S.G., 668 So. 2d 828, 831 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388)
("[S]tate regulations that interfere with the fundamental right to remarry will be subject to strict scrutiny and
will be upheld only if they are 'supported by sufficiently important state interests and [are] closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests."'); see also Granville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604, 610-11 (Auiz. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decision to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed).
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Section I of this Note has provided some history on the evolution of
marriage between ethnicities. Section II illustrates the general current rule of
marital restrictions within wills. In Sections m and IV, this Note will examine
the existing state of the law concerning testamentary will restrictions that are
generally upheld, followed by those exceptions that are a bit contradictory.
Sections V and VI explain why marital restrictions primarily based on ethnicity
should be declared void despite their construction.
II. The Current State of the Law on Testamentary Marriage Restrictions
Generally, a testator may condition her devises as she pleases. It is
established public policy to give great latitude to a testator in the final disposition
of her estate.18 A court's primary objective is effectuating the testator's intent,
and thus, her intention is to be given effect to the maximum extent allowed by
law.19 It is not the court's place "to question the [testator's] wisdom, fairness or
reasonableness" in her division of property. 20 The testamentary devise of both
real and personal property responds to the cherished ideal of preserving the
testator's dominion over his own property. Nonetheless, the right to make a
testamentary disposition is purely a creation of statute and under legislative
control. Therefore, dispositions must remain legal.2'
The testator is limited in attaching-certain conditions to the distribution
of his property. For instance, a testamentary condition barring a devisee's
marriage is void as contrary to the public policy favoring marriage. 22 Still, the
courts have been divided when confronted with a testator' s conditions restricting
the devisee's uninhibited freedom to marry.
18 See U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 867-68 (Or. 1954) (holding that a testamentary
provision requiring, as a condition to beneficiary's taking, that the heir prove that she had not embraced a
particular religious faith or married a man of that faith, before the age of thirty-two, did not unreasonably
restrict freedom of beneficiary's choice).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY WILLs AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003)
("The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a donative document is the donor's intention.
The donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law."). Note as well that the Donor's
intention may be referred to as his "actual intention" as opposed to the donor's attributed intention. To
determine the donor's intention, all relevant evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, may be considered,
including the text of the donative document and relevant extrinsic evidence. Id. at 53.
20 Id. cmt. c.
21 See id. ("American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts to
make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law.").
22 See infra note 34; see also Watts v. Griffin, 137 N.C. 572, 572 (1905) (holding that a condition
stating that if a devisee married a common woman, he would not have any interest in the house and lot given to
him in the will is void for uncertainty and operated only to divest and not to prevent the vesting of the interest so
given); Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212, 212 (1857) (holding that a condition absolutely restraining marriage is
void as against public policy). But see Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 617 (Md. 1919) (finding that partial
limitation of marriage is valid unless it unreasonably limits the right of the beneficiary to marry).
'TILL [MY PARENTS'] DEATH Do Us PART
A. Marriage Restrictions Traditionally Upheld
As a general rule, restrictions, conditions, and limitations in partial
restraint of marriage are upheld if they do not unreasonably restrict the freedom
of the beneficiary's choice of spouse.23 Case law suggests that an unreasonable
handicap on the devisee' s choice of spouse is void. Common law, however, has
dictated that virtually all partial restrictions on the devisee' s marriage in order to
take are valid and reasonable-that is to say, only restrictions generally
restricting marriage are void.24  In U.S. National Bank of Portland v.
Snodgrass,25 the decedent's daughter sued to have property given to her under
the will despite the conditional provisions requiring her to refrain from marrying
a Catholic man before her thirty-second birthday.26 The court found that the
provision requiring the condition precedent was a valid, partially restrictive
devise, and did not allow the devisee to take because she had married a Catholic
man.27 The court based its reasoning primarily on a constitutional argument-
that neither the invasion of a beneficiary's right to religious freedom, nor
unconstitutional discrimination, nor a violation of public policy arising from
either category (religion or age) had occurred, thus the restrictions were therefore
reasonable. 28 Because the testator was not wholly or "generally" inhibiting the
devisee's right to marry by use of the restriction allowing the devisee to marry
anyone who was not of the Catholic faith, the devise was only partially
restrictive.
It is the courts' duty to determine which partial marital restraints are
reasonable and which are not.29 Courts have been fairly consistent in defining
what testamentary restrictions will be upheld. These conditions include the right
to limit the marriage to a certain individual or to a certain family or ethnicity. In
Hall v. Eaton,3° for example, the court's holding validated attempts by parents or
guardians to prevent unmarried children from marrying named individuals,
marrying before a certain age, marrying without consent, as well as attempts to
23 See Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 868 ("The general rule seems to be well settled that conditions and
limitations in partial restraint of marriage will be upheld if they do not unreasonably restrict the freedom of the
beneficiary's choice.").
24 Id. at 868 (discussing the presumption that where the restraint is not general, but merely partial, then
the restraint may or may not be void).
25 Id. at 860 (holding that a testamentary provision requiring, as a condition to beneficiary's taking, that
the heir prove that she had not, embraced a particular religious faith or married a man of that faith, before the
age of thirty-two, did not unreasonably restrict freedom of beneficiary's choice).
26 Id. at 862 (discussing the decedent's devise).
27 Id. at 862 ("The appellant asserts that the... provision of the will which disinherited her because of
her marriage to a member of the Catholic faith before she was thirty two years old [is invalid].").
28 Id. at 867 (discussing the fact that there is a time limitation on the restriction-after age thirty two,
the daughter was free to marry a Catholic and also receive her inheritance).
29 WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.25.
30 Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E. 2d 805 (11. App. Ct. 1994).
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prevent remarriage of spouses.31 Hall filed suit seeking a declaration that the
condition in her father's will providing that she not be married in order to receive
her devise of an undivided one-half interest in a remainder to real estate was null
and void as against public policy.32 The court reasoned that it is less desirable to
encourage a child to divorce a certain individual as opposed to, at an earlier
stage, to encourage a child not to marry that particular individual.33 However,
attempts to prevent unmarried children from marrying at all (general restraints)
are contrary to public policy and void-thus defining the line between general
34and partial restrictions of marriage.
Additionally, marital testamentary restrictions have been upheld when
concerning a particular person. In Re Stone's Estate35 held valid a provision
against the marriage of a devisee, Grace Heile. The testamentary clause
provided, "I give and bequeath to Grace Heile ... the sum of one thousand
($1,000.00) dollars provided she does not marry Thomas Brazil. If she does
enter into a marriage with the said Thomas Brazil, then this bequest is void."
36
The right of Grace Heile to receive the legacy was dependent upon her ability to
meet the condition "that she does not marry Thomas Brazil";37 it was at the time
of the death of the testatrix that the gift to her was to take effect, provided she
had not married Thomas Brazil.38 The condition "required by the testatrix was
one of fact, and that was to be determined as it existed when the will took effect.
The auditor found that the legatee did not marry Thomas Brazil, and this fact
[was] undisputed."3 9 Therefore, the court found that the devisee was entitled to
receive the legacy bequeathed to her.4° It necessarily follows that if one had
married the "undesirable candidate" that the devise would be void. Barring any
unforeseen circumstances, had Grace Heile married Thomas Brazil, the devise
would have been void for violating the condition.
31 Id. at 808 ("[A]ttempts to prevent unmarried children from marrying named individuals (partial
restraints), or from marrying before a certain age, or from marrying without consent, are valid.").
32 Id. at 806 ("Cynthia Ann Hall brought suit asking the trial court to declare null and void a condition
imposed by her father's will upon his devise to her of an undivided one-half interest in a remainder to real
estate.").
33 See infra note 123.
34 See Hall, 631 N.E. 2d at 805 (holding that a condition imposed upon a testator's daughter fordevise
of his property that she not be married at the time of his or his wife's death did not encourage divorce, in
violation of public policy, where testator's motive was to protect daughter from misappropriation by her
husband); see also Olin Browder, Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Marriage, 39 MICH. L REv. 1288,
1323 (1941) (conceding that a general restraint of marriage is not upheld, but there are other ways to limit
marriage of a devisee).
In re Stone's Estate, 57 Pa. D. & C. 284, 288-98 (1947) (determining that the legatee did not marry
the named person and so was entitled to receive the legacy).
S Id. at 288.
37 Id.
3s Id. (providing that the condition became effective at the time of death of the testatrix).
39 Id.
40 Id. (finding that Grace Heile was entitled to receive her devise).
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Generally, a testator can limit or restrict the marriage to a certain
individual because the restriction of choice is not "unreasonable. ,41 The court in
Maddox v. Maddox implies that simply reducing the eligible pool of bachelors or
bachelorettes by one leaves open the great possibility that another suitable
marriage partner is still available.42 The court gives no credence to the
possibility that there may truly exist only one love for each person, considering
only legality rather than a devisee' s personal preference. Thus, eliminating one,
two or even an entire minority group, such as African-Americans in the United
States, is reasonable because there are still approximately two hundred billion
more people from which to choose whom are not of African-American descent.43
In re Liberman44 establishes that one may also legally prevent a devisee
from taking under the will by conditioning the devise upon marriage to a person
of a certain ethnic background. In Liberman, the testator conditioned one devise
to a child upon his marrying a "Jewess. ''45 The court stated that "conditions not
to marry a Papist, or a Scotchman, or not to marry anybody but a Jew have been
held good. '"46 Conditions such as these "seem to have been sustained whenever
challenged."47 The testator in Liberman made it clear that he intended to restrain
his son from marrying anyone but a Jewess.48 Subsequently, the court reasoned
41 See Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804, 804 (1854) (holding that the "condition imposed by the
bequest... to Ann Maria Maddox, which in effect forbade her to marry any other than a member of the Society
of Friends, was an undue and unreasonable restraint upon the choice of marriage, and ought to be disregarded").
42 Id. (" [E] ven in those cases in which restraints of a partial character may be imposed on marriage, as
in respect of time, place or person, they must be such only as are just, fair and reasonable.").
43 See THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000 1, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubslc2kbrOl-5.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2008) ("Census 2000 showed that the United States population on April 1, 2000 was 281.4
million. Of the total, 36.4 million, or 12.9 percent, reported Black or African American.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
" In re Lberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 661 (N.Y. 1939) (citing Hodgson v. Halford, (1879) L. R. 11 Ch.
Div. (Eng.) 959) (finding that limiting marriage to a person of a certain ethnic background, such as a Papist, is a
valid marital restriction). It is important to note that despite the mature nature of many of these cases, the law
remains valid. Most recent cases do not involve such restrictions as professional calling or the fortune of the
potential spouse or ethnic affilation. It is probable that these restrictions exist but are either (1) complied with
or (2) settled out of court regularly. However, it is still possible for testators to restrict the marriage of their kin
based on the race or ethnicity and religious affiliation of the potential spouse. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 6.2 rep. n.4 (stating that "[n]o partial restraints on marriage outside a particular racial group were
found. Possibly courts would be more reluctant to enforce a partial restraint in this area in light of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1968").
45 Liberman, 18 N.E.2d at 660. The devise also required that his siblings approve the marriage-
otherwise they get his share.
46 Id. (citing Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455 (1916)).
47 Id; see, e.g., Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455, 455 (1916) (holding that marriage through
consent of parents is a partial restraint of marriage, both reasonable and valid); Hodgson v. Halford, (1879) 11
Ch. D. 959, 959 (U.K.) (finding that limiting marriage to a person of a certain ethnic background, such as a
Papist, is a valid marital restriction).
48 Liberman, 18 N.E.2d at 659 ("[E]xtrinsic evidence establishes that the purpose of the condition,
imposed by the testator, was to restrain his son from marrying any but a Jewess."). Yet, the point is moot in
this case since other interested beneficiaries were required to approve his marriage or else they would get the
property. Id. at 660.
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that although it was acceptable to impose reasonable restrictions on marriage
according to the standards of the testator, under the circumstances present here
the restriction was void as against public policy.
49
Moreover, holding that a restrictive gift generally calculated to induce a
beneficiary to marry or not to marry in a manner desired by testator may be valid,
the Liberman court held that "whether a condition [annexed to a testamentary
gift] in restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the form of the
condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the circumstances of the
particular case.' 50  The court clarified by saying that what has been decided in
previous cases may often guide decisions in analogous cases, but no rigid rule
based on ancient precedents dictates a decision where the circumstances are
different and reason points to another conclusion. 5' This allows courts to decide
these cases on a case-by-case basis, not to simply fall back on ancient principle.
Finally, the courts have traditionally upheld all marital limitations
relating to a potential spouse's social position. In Greene v. Kirkwood,5 2 the
court held that a gift over in the event of the devisee marrying a man "beneath
her in social position" was valid.53 In re Harris' Will5 4 established the courts'
approval of testamentary conditions in restraint of marriage within particular
classes of persons, similar to In re Stone's Estate's55 holding relating to specific
persons. The courts' reasoning in these cases rests principally on the historical
perspective, and both primarily cite to Matter of Seaman's Will.
56
49 Id. at 650 ("[T]he natural tendency of the condition contained in the will is to restrain all marriage
and for that reason it is void."). The court continued:
When the condition is considered in its complete setting it becomes evident that the intention of the
testator, as expressed in his will, is not merely to prevent the beneficiary from marrying any person
other than a Jewess or even from entering into an ill-advised marriage, but to prevent any marriage
not approved by the very persons who by approval would lose the benefit of a legacy which they
might otherwise keep. Both reason and authority dictate the conclusion that such a condition is
invalid.
Id
so Id. at 661.
51 Id. at 662.
52 Greene v. Kirkwood, [1895] 1 I.R. 130 (Ir.) (holding that agift over of real estate valid if the devisee
marries a man not of her same social class).
53 Id; see also Jenner v. Turner, (1880) 16 Ch. D. 188, 188 (U.K.) (holding that a condition that the
devisee shall not marry a domestic servant, or any person who has been a domestic servant, is valid).
5 See In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 746, 748 (1955) (holding that testamentary restrictions in
general restraint of marriage are void as against public policy, but partial restraints are not void).
55 See In re Stone's Estate 57 Pa. D. & C. 284, 288-89 (1947) (holding that if a devisee has fulfilled
the condition for the gift at the time the will is executed, she is entitled to that gift).
56 In re Seaman's Will, 112 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1916). Here the will provided a third share to the
testator's daughter, "provided, that at the time of my decease my said daughter shall be married to some person
other than one Leo Fassler who now resides in the city of New York and is there engaged in the practice of law,
or provided that at the time of my death the said Leo Fassler is dead." Id. at 577. See, e.g., In re Harris' Will,
143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (1955) (stating that "conditions [in] general restraint of marriage were regarded at
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It is apparent that in each of these cases, though they purport to take
each case on its own merit, the historical reasoning is a primary and uniting
characteristic. Even so, Matter of Seaman's Will5 7 was predicated on In
Graydon's Executors v. Graydon.5s In Graydon's Executors, the Chancellor
held lawful a restraint on marriage condition imposed upon a bequest to a
devisee (his son). Such gift would be void should the son marry a daughter of a
person named in the will, within a stated period of time. 59 The court reasoned
that:
[I]t is the duty of the courts to favor this or any other legal means
which a father may adopt to enforce the authority which the law, for
wise purposes, has given to him over his minor children, and that
regard for his wishes and counsel in the more important concerns of
their lives after maturity, which the untrammeled testamentary power
conferred by our law is calculated to secure.
60
This rule at common law, when first implemented, was created to protect
minor children-that is, those who had not attained marriageable age or become
of age to engage in self-determination. Thus, the testator implementing these
marriage restrictions originally retained this discerning power because he was
thought of as protecting his offspring before they could make their own informed
decisions about their potential marriage partner.
Because courts depend heavily on the concept of what is "reasonable or
uncertain," there emerges another common thread amongst the cases discussed
above. Attributes that the courts hold enforceable in a marriage restriction (skin
color, ethnicity, personal identity in the cases where one person is "forbidden" to
a devisee, religion, social status) are generally thought to be certain
characteristics: Those which are known characteristics for the most part and are
generally permanent in nature. What is most peculiar about these various marital
restrictions is that the court upholds such restrictions where the devisee (and his
potential spouse) have no control over the circumstances (other than to choose
another willing partner). These restrictions concern the potential spouse's
permanent attributes, such as his race, ethnicity, or family culture. These are
"certain" and unchanging characteristics of the individual. Traits such as family
lineage and race are permanent, both of which the testator is permitted to
common law as contrary to public policy, and therefore void").
57 In re Seaman's Will, 112 N.E. 576 (N.Y. 1916).
58 Graydon's Ex'rs v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229 (1888).
59 Id. The restraint was deemed lawful despite the fact that it required the son to break an engagement
of marriage into which he had entered before he knew of the provision in his father's will and before the will
was executed.
60 Id.
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discriminate against. Other characteristics, such as occupation or financial
situations, are changeable both for the better and for the worse; these are
generally overruled.61
Perhaps courts are deferring to a testator's reasoning, not simply his
intention. In this way, fathers can protect their daughters and mothers can
protect their sons from what they "know" about an ethnic group or do not care
for in a specific person or vice versa. By deferring to these wishes, however,
courts are indirectly endorsing the values and ideals the testator holds by
conflrming a facially intentional, bigoted testamentary restriction, or at least
letting the hatred or misconception concerning a particular person or group
persist and simmer in the minds of the devisee (whether or not he chooses to
conform). A man can not change his color, ethnicity, or familial roots. It is
curious why courts enforce restrictions on marriage to a person of a specific race
or ethnicity but not of a profession.
B. Partial Marital Restrictions Traditionally Overruled
As previously discussed, it has been held that no restriction that is
uncertain or unreasonable will be legitimate. 62 This subjective conception of
"reasonableness" has been left to the courts to determine on an individual basis.63
What has traditionally been included in the category of voided restrictions are
general restraints to marriage,64 marrying one from a certain profession65 or
fortune,66 as well as marrying one of a certain social stature or group.
67
61 See infra Part ll.B for further discussion.
62 See supra note 23 (discussing unreasonable restriction of freedom of choice).
63 See supra note 51 (determining that courts should look at restrictions on a case-by-case basis rather
than letting "ancient precedents" dictate decisions).
6 See In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (N.Y. 1939) (holding that although a testator may choose
the objects of his own bounty, the court may deny validity to a condition contrary to public policy). States also
universally have held that conditioning a devise on an heir never marrying (which is a general restraint) is void.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (2000) ("While complete
prohibitions of marriage fail, guidance by parents and other donors, with respect to a particular marriage,
validity may be exercised by means of partial restraints.").
65 See Conditions, Conditional Limitations, or Contracts in Restraint of Marriage, 122 A.L.R. 7, 30
(citing I Eq. Cas. Abr. 110, pl. 2) (stating that "it is said that a devise upon condition not to many at all, or not
to marry a person of such a profession or calling, is void, whether there be a limitation over or not; but if it were
upon condition not to marry a Papist, or a certain person by name, it may be good"). But cf. Jenner v. Turner,
(1880) 16 Ch. D. 188, 188 (U.K.) (holding that a condition that the devisee shall not marry a domestic servant,
or anyjerson who has been a domestic servant, is valid).
See Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205,205 (1795) (holding that a condition that the legatee shall not
marry any man who does not own at the time of his marriage an unencumbered estate in fee simple with a
yearly value of £500, is invalid as amounting practically to a prohibition of marriage). A condition not to marry
a man of a particular profession, or who lives in a named town or country, or who does not own an estate, are
also in general restraint of marriage and are therefore void. Id.; see also State v. Lifer, 392 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177
(1976) (holding that marriage brokerage contracts are void as against public policy).
67 See Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617, 617 (Md. 1919) (holding that wills which vest an estate to a
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For instance, in Turner v. Evans68 the testator tried to limit his
daughter's devise if she insisted on marrying one whom the testator failed to
approve. The provision read, "provided she does not intermarry with the person
who is now paying court to her, it being my intention not to interfere with my
said daughter marrying any person whom I regard as her social equal, but so far
as in my power to prevent her contracting an unsuitable marriage. "69 The Turner
court held this provision inoperable because the term, "social equal" is ill defined
as well as uncertain in its determination. 70 However, the court did consider the
phrase "the person now paying court to her" as not unreasonable or uncertain (as
the testator was aware of the suitor in question) but the restriction operated as
mutually exclusive from the latter restriction of social equality and so, was
upheld.71
Keily v. Monck 72 discusses the determination that a testamentary
provision of requiring the devisee to marry someone of a certain fortune is
invalid. Keily held that a provision that the legatee (a woman) shall not marry
any man who does not own at the time of his marriage an unencumbered estate
in fee simple with a yearly value of £500, is invalid as amounting practically to a
prohibition of marriage.73 Though the court did not enumerate or quantify
numerically, they implied that since the restriction cut off so many other eligible
bachelors in favor of one who was quite substantially more affluent, that it
effectively and unreasonably limited the daughter's choice of spouse.
Though Section A outlined that generally a person's religion was a valid
testamentary restriction, some jurisdictions have forbidden the testator to
condition devise on a potential spouses' religious beliefs. Lasnier v. Martin
74
and Maddox v. Maddox75 held that to condition a devisee's taking on her
marrying within a certain religion was void for uncertainty. In Lasnier the
testator devised the residuary of his estate as follows: "After 21 years elapse
after the death of my beloved wife, should the building be sold the amount to be
divided amongst and between the children of my brothers and sisters that have
daughter on the condition that she marry "some one who is her social equal" is void for uncertainty).
68 d.
69 Id. at 618.
70 Id. However, the court did consider the phrase "the person now paying court to her" as not operating
as mutually exclusive from the latter restriction of social equality.
71 Turner, 106 A. at 619.
72 Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. P. C. 205,205 (1795) (holding additionally that a condition not to marry a
person of a particular profession, or who lives in a named town or country, or who does not own an estate, are
also in general restraint of marriage and are therefore void); see also White v. Equitable Nuptial Benefit Union,
76 Ala. 251, 259 (1884) ("If the condition is of such nature and rigidity in its requirements as to operate as a
probable prohibition, it is void.").
73 Id.
74 171 P. 645 (Kan. 1918) (stating that the devise in question was void for uncertainty).
75 52 Va. 804 (1854) (holding the restrictions in the codicil void).
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remained good Catholics and good Citizens. '7 6 The devise was overruled as an
unreasonable testamentary restriction.7 7 Similarly in Maddox, it was held that
78the devise to a daughter was unreasonable. The court invalidated the
testamentary marriage restriction requiring a daughter to remain in the Society of
Friends79 by picking a husband from among the congregation's eligible
bachelors. In Maddox, it was found that there were merely five or six bachelors
belonging to the Society of Friends in Virginia.8 ° Surely if a woman had only
five or six men from which to choose, this would be unduly burdensome for her,
but what arbitrary number would the courts set to determine the restriction
reasonable and not unduly restrictive? Ten? One hundred? Three hundred?
The court failed to elaborate.
C. Restrictive Devises Overruled in Other Areas
In re Potter's Will,81 the testator had directed that income derived from
residue of his estate be dispersed "to and for the use support maintenance and
education of the poor white citizens of Kent County generally., 82 The court
invalidated the devise as written.83 The court reasoned that the devise
constituted a manner of governmental entwinement with affairs of a charitable
trust protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the government could not
enforce discriminating devises and motives. 84
Instead of invalidating the will altogether, the court chose to reform the
devise using the cy pres doctrine.85  This doctrine seeks to preserve the
76 Lasnier, 171 P. at 645
77 ld. at 647.
78 Maddox, 52 Va. at 807 (holding that "the condition imposed by the bequest of the third in remainder
to Ann Maria Maddox, which in effect forbade her to marry any other than a member of the Society of Friends,
was an undue and unreasonable restraint upon the choice of marriage, and ought to be disregarded").
79 Presently known as Quakers. See generally Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Packard v. U.S., No. 98-
6223 (2d Cir. Dec. 21, 1998) (clarifying the synonyms for Quakers which have been previously used).
90 Maddox, 52 Va. at 804 ("When M arrived at a marriageable age, there were but five or six
unmarried men of the society in the neighborhood in which she lived.").
81 In re Potter's Will, 275 A.2d 574, 583 (Del. Ch. 1970) (holding a devise to assist "poor white
citizens" invalid and against public policy).
82 Id. at 576.
83 See id. at 583 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment applied in this situation due to entanglement
doctrine as applied to a trustee corporation substantially owned by the state).
4 See id. at 582 (highlighting the fact that the state owned a 49% interest in the trustee corporation and
appointed one third of the board of directors).
85 See id. at 583 (opining that cy pres doctrine can serve to meet the desires of the devisor while
circumventing effects prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment). The doctrine of cy pres is a rule of equity,
and before it may be applied, three prerequisites must be met: (1) the court must determine whether the gift
creates a valid charitable trust; (2) it must be established that it is impossible or impractical to carry out the
specific purpose of the trust; and (3) and the court must determine whether, in creating the charitable trust, the
testator or settlor had a general charitable intent. The doctrine can only be applied where the specific purpose of
the trust fails due to impossibility, illegality, or impracticability. See In re Rood's Estate, 200 N.W.2d 728,734
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substantial intention of the testator at the expense of changing the form of the
devise.8 6 In this case, the trust was changed to include non-white citizens, since
between the time the testator had written the instrument and the effective date all
people (African-Americans now included) became recognized as citizens.87 This
saving device is applied so that when the specific purpose of a settlor cannot be
carried out, his charitable intention will be fulfilled as nearly as possible.88 The
court took the liberty of interpreting the terms of the devise, presuming the intent
of the testator was to "aid the poor citizens of his county," in order to effectuate
the best use of the trust instead of effectively voiding it altogether by revoking its
tax-exempt status.89
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit racial or religious
discrimination in private transactions unless state action is involved.9° The
freedom to dispose of property at death, however, is still not considered a
fundamental constitutional right. Indeed, the "right to testamentary disposition
and the right to succession by will of property within the jurisdiction of a state
exists only by -statutory enactment by such state so providing and may be
regulated, limited, conditioned, or wholly abolished by such state." 91
Courts have held that at times a prohibition against alienating except to a
small class of persons such as the testator's heirs is void.92 In Williams v.
McPherson,93 the testator's aim was to restrict the use or ownership of his
property to only his family. 94 The provision was deemed void as contrary to
public policy as a restraint upon alienation.95 This case mimics the concern that
(Mich. App. 1972) (stating that the cy pres doctrine is a saving device which could be applied in this case when
the specific purpose of the settlor cannot be carried out, allowing his charitable intention to be fulfilled as nearly
as possible); In re Lung's Estate, 5 Pa. D.& C.3d 602, 613 (Pa. Com. P. 1978) (holding that where a will
creates a fund for the establishment of an asylum for "white women" and it is clear that the primary purpose of
the testator was charitable, the will shall be amended to remove the restrictions as to race and sex); In re
Cramp's Estate, 77 A. 814, 815 (Pa. 1910) (deciding that the court may, under general jurisdiction of the court,
have "the power to vary the precise terms of a charitable trust, when necessary").
86 See supra note 85 (describing the doctrine of cy pres).
87 See In re Potter's Will, 275 A.2d 574, 581 (Del. Ch. 1970) (finding that devise was penned prior to
recognition of universal citizenship).
88 See id. at 584 (applying cy pres doctrine to preserve the intent of the settlor).
89 See id. at 583 (using cy pres doctrine to preserve testator's intent).
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.").
91 Heckler v. United Bank of Boulder, 476 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1973) (citing Demorest v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944)).
92 See Bank of Powhattan v. Rooney, 72 P.2d 993, 994 (Kan. 1937) (holding that a provision in a will
preventing property from being alienated except to a particular class of persons is invalid); Williams v.
McPherson, 5 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C. 1939) (holding that restraints upon alienation are void); Carpenter v.
Allen, 248 S.W. 523, 525 (Ky. 1923) (finding no distinction between deed and will in regards to validity of
prohibitions against alienation).
93 5 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 1939).
94 See id. at 830 (noting that testator's will provided that property could not be sold or bought except by
testator's heirs).
95 See id. at 831 (finding that any prohibition of alienation is void and contrary to public policy).
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the testator has in conditioning devises through marriage-they simply do not
wish the "outsider" or "undesirable" person to have the use of their property.
96
Most likely the property would be given to those that uphold the testator's ethical
or belief system--one who would not allow the undesirable to use the property.
III. Arguments for Marriage Restrictions Being Upheld
There are various arguments which suggest that a testator' s restrictions,
whether they are based on marriage or not, should be upheld. The first, and
perhaps the most prevalent argument, is that a testator's intent is the most
important factor to courts and thus should be executed at all times. 97 Thus, it
follows that the court's main objective is to effectuate this intent to the extent
that the intent does not violate state or federal laws.98 After all, the testator's
property being devised is just that-the testator' s. He is generally allowed to do
with it as he pleases in life and does so upon his death with the use of a last will
and testament.99
Still others would argue that despite the case law, restricting marriage
"partially" or in any other way should not be prohibited based on the four comers
of the U.S. Constitution. This Constitutional argument first appeared in United
States National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass,'°° which began to define the
boundaries of modem-day marriage restrictions by stating:
[I]t is not until actions motivated by the intolerant extremes of bigotry
contravene the positive law or invade the boundaries of established
public policy that the law is quickened to repress such illegal excesses
and in proper cases levy toll upon the offenders as reparation to those
who have been damaged thereby.'
0'
Until the testator's devises are used in a way that offends the law, they are
considered private, which the law must respect. °2 The court noted that
96 See Lauer v. Hoffman, 88 A. 496, 499 (1913) (discussing devise of property to testator's wife and
daughter with a restriction on sale).
97 See Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90, 100 (1913) (holding "there is no higher duty which rests upon a
court than to carry out the intentions of a testator when the provision is not repugnant to public policy"); see
also Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1970) (noting that Georgia law specifically allowed racial
restrictions within devises); Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454,456 (Mass. 1889) (upholding a trust as valid against
creditors despite age restrictions).
98 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 10.1 (2003) ("The donor's intention is given effect to
the maximum extent allowed by law.").
99 See PAGE, supra note 29, § 1.6 (discussing testator's discretion in devising property).
100 U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954).
101 Id. at 863.
102 See id. at 864 (stating that the court will not modify a will unless it offends public law or policy).
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[t]wo general and cardinal propositions give direction and limitation
to our consideration. One is the traditionally great freedom that the
law confers on the individual with respect to the disposition of his
property, both before and after death. The other is that greater
freedom, the freedom of opinion and right to expression in political
and religious matters, together with the incidental and corollary right
to implement the attainment of the ultimate and favored objectives of
the religious teaching and social or political philosophy to which an
individual subscribes.1
0 3
Thus, a testator would be free to devise his property as he wishes unless the
disposition violated a state or federal law. Under this reasoning, every partial
devise deemed "unreasonable" for reasons other than violating the Constitution
or State law would be held valid.
The law has not approached marital restrictions in this way though. In
Shapira v. Union National Bank,1 4 the provision in question provided that a son
was not to take under his mother's will unless he was married at the time of her
death to a Jewish woman with Jewish parents. 05 The court addressed both the
constitutional and public policy arguments but ultimately focused on the
reasonableness of the bequest."°6 They found that the bequest was reasonable
because of the ample time given to the son to find a suitable bride, but more
importantly, because the will contained a gift-over to the State of Israel, the
bequest did not operate in terrorem'0 7 and was therefore valid.108 Because the
testamentary restriction placed on him was not unreasonable, unconstitutional or
against public policy, the son was not entitled to any of the estate because he had
not complied with its terms.
109
The last key argument addressed in favor of a testator's absolute
autonomy considers the right to devise as a protected form of free speech as well
as a freedom of religion. With few limitations, one of those areas with wide
latitude of sufferance is found in the construction of one's last will and
testament. It is a field wherein no court will question the correctness of a
testator's religious views or prejudices." 10 In Snodgrass, the court explains that
103 Id.
104 Shapira v. Union Nat'l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Misc. 1974).
105 See id. at 826 (finding a devise that only allowed disbursement if the testator's son married a Jewish
woman before his mother's death was valid).
106 See id at 831-32 (focusing on the clarity, definiteness and depth of the testator's conviction in
creating the condition for his son's devise).
107 See infra Part VI (discussing the difference between in terrorem and non-in terrorem clauses).
108 See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 828 (reasoning that by enforcing the testamentary marital restriction,
they were simply enforcing the restriction to take under the will, not the son's uninhibited right to marry).
109 See id. at 832 ("[I]t is the dutyof this court to honor the testator's intention within the limitations of
law and of public policy.").
10 See Watts v. Griffin, 137 S.E. 572, 572 (N.C. 1905) (stating that the law refuses to enforce
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"[o]ur exalted religious freedom is buttressed by another freedom of coordinate
importance. In condemning what may appear to one as words of offensive
religious intolerance, we must not forget that the offending expression may enjoy
the protection of another public policy-the freedom of speech."" I
But it is clear that courts have not adopted the above belief system; quite
to the contrary, they have made numerous exceptions to legitimizing various
whims of the testator (discussed briefly above). 1 2 In order to effectuate the
testator's intent to the fullest extent possible, the courts often utilize a balancing
test when faced with the nature of dispute discussed below.
113
IV. The Balancing Test: To Uphold or Not to Uphold?
United States National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass established that:
[n]o matter ...how narrow and no matter how prejudiced or
dogmatic the arguments of devotees of one belief may appear to
others .... the right of either to so express himself is so a part and
parcel of our public policy that it will be defended and protected...
to the uttermost, unless it is found that the fanatical and unrestrained
enthusiasm of its followers results in acts offensive to the positive
law.'
14
that no one may question it's authority. This is the prevailing view, and yet
courts still play the balancing game when it comes to the interests of the testator
versus the interests of the devisees and the state.'
For example, in Hall v. Eaton116 the testator imposed a condition upon
the devise of property to his daughter that she not be married at the time of the
latter of either his or his wife's death. 17 The court held that this testamentary
condition did not encourage divorce in violation of public policy. 18 It reasoned
conditions in restraint of marriage or those offending the law).
i U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863 (Or. 1954).
112 See supra note 97-113 and accompanying text (discussing the policy of enforcing testamentary
intent).
113 See Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("No benefits are
present to balance against this injury and we hold that to allow the condition in the will would be in violation of
the public policy of this state.") (emphasis added).
114 Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 864.
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 cmt. g (1959) (outlining the balancing test for
capricious purposes and those that offend public policy); see also Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217 (balancing
positive benefits against injurious possibilities in following will as written).
116 Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Il. Ct. App. 1994).
117 See id. at 806 ("In the event that my daughter... shall be married at the date of the death of the
latter to die of my spouse and myself, I give that portion of the estate which would have passed to my daughter,
to Mercantile Trust and Savings Bank.").
ns See id. at 809 (upholding the validity of the testamentary condition).
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that "[n]ot every encouragement of divorce is objectionable," especially where a
testator's motive is to protect a child from an inharmonious marriage or a
spendthrift spouse.'1 19 If the court had decided this condition did violate public
policy, the invalidity of that part of the will would have defeated the decedent's
overall testamentary intent and may have invalidated the entire will.
120
According to Snodgrass, the intent of the testator is the first and
foremost priority of the court.121 However, when a devisee is married at the time
of the devise, the court should void as contrary to public policy any restriction of
the testator's that encourages divorce.122 It is not possible for the court to reach
the result that it does without taking the testator's motive into account. In fact,
the Hall court admits that if motive were not taken into account "[a] condition to
a devise, the tendency of which is to encourage divorce or bring about separation
of husband and wife, is against public policy, and void.' ' 123  This holding is
totally at odds with the maxim that the motive is not to be taken into account
when determining the intent of the testator. 124 The court wanted to reach the
correct and intended result, but could not have a fair outcome without looking
into the testator's intended purpose and motivations.125 Whether a testamentary
condition in restraint of marriage is reasonable, and therefore valid, depends not
upon the form of condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the
circumstances of the particular case. 1
26
119 See id. at 808 (discussing instances in which encouragement of divorce would not be seen as
violative of public policy). Incidentally, a divorce at the time suit was filed would have no effect upon the
interest which daughter took. Id. ("[O]nce the trust came into existence, once it was determined that Hall was
married at the time of her mother's death, [she] had nothing to gain by a divorce. Even if [she] then divorced
her husband she would not be entitled to principal unless she became 'a widow."').
120 Id. at 807 (citing Williams v. Crickman, 405 N.E.2d 799, 804 (M1. 1980)) ("Invalidity of part of the
will based on one of these grounds, if it would defeat decedent's overall testamentary intent and scheme, may
invalidate the entire will.").
121 See U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954) ("In view of this liberality of
testamentary power, we find no occasion to narrow the freedom of a testator's right to dispose of his
accumulations unless we are compelled to bend before some other public law or policy establishing limitations
not presently apparent.").
122 See In re Peterson's Estate, 365 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1961) (reversing and remanding a decision
disinheriting a widow who remarried and stating that the "law has been resourceful in developing policies which
give stability to the marriage state and seek to preserve it as a basic institution in our society").
123 See Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d. 805, 807 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a condition to devise did not
encourage divorce).
124 See PAGE, supra note 29, § 30.7 (discussing the consideration of testator's intent).
In construing a will the court has no power to make a will for the testator or to attempt to improve
upon the will which testator actually made. The court cannot begin by inferring testator's intention
and then construe the will so as to give effect to this intention, however probable it may be....
Id.
'15 See Hall, 631 N.E.2d. at 808-09 (expounding on the various reasons a testator may have for placing
marital restrictions on a devise and applying that reasoning to the case at hand).
126 See In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Surf. Ct. 1955) (describing the precedent established
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William Drennan refined his own balancing test and proffers that this
approach is truly what should be considered given that the testamentary
restriction is lawful to begin with. 127  His test takes the following four factors
into account: (1) nature of the property involved; (2) type of restriction imposed;
(3) testator's purpose in imposing the restriction; and (4) likely impact of the
restriction on the heirs and society in general. 128 This Note endorses this test, but
argues that the last element should be accorded the most weight. The fact that
the decedent no longer benefits from the property upon his demise, but may still
effectively influence the lives of the living, is not a small concern. Moreover, the
court discourages waste in general and to that end, it has the power to declare
restrictions unreasonable if they impede the progression of society. 29
The "testator's purpose," however, should also be given more weight.
Drennan proffers that the purpose behind a testamentary will restriction simply
requires the court to examine the testator's reasonableness in making the
devise. 13  By taking the decedent's purpose into account, it forces the court to
look beyond the mere effect of the restriction and scrutinize the catalyst that is
prompting the exclusion. 131  The courts would be forced to realize and
acknowledge the malicious and often bigoted reasons for conditioning a gift in
such a way, and therefore, would be provided with a basis for declaring the
devise void.
V. Marriage Restrictions Should be Held as Void
The constitutionality of marital restrictions has been argued and defeated
on the ground that the fundamental right to marry was not being impeded
directly. 3 2 However, the argument that coercive will restrictions are protected
in In re Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658 (N.Y. 1939)).
127 See generally William Drennan, Wills Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of
Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43 (2005) (discussing the
balancing test courts must carry out between a testator's dead-hand restriction on the use of devised property
and an heir's ability to have that restriction declared unenforceable).
128 See id. at 47 (describing the factors courts consider when they cannot void a use restriction based on
the technical rules of construction).
129 In the case of real property, if there is an unreasonable restriction inhibiting the use when there is no
alternate devise or gift-over, the court will render the restriction unenforceable. The property then falls into
residuary or the offending language is disregarded. See In re Scott's Will, 93 N.W. 109, 109 (Minn. 1903)
(examining whether a bequest is truly revoked when the new disposition instructs the executor to "destroy all
the rest and residue of the money or cash or other evidence of credit that to me or to my estate may belong").
130 See Drennan, supra note 127, at 49 (discussing the differing respect accorded by courts to dead-
hand restrictions that appear arbitrary versus restrictions that elucidate concrete concerns of the testator).
131 See id. at 62 (noting of court decisions that "[w]hen it appears that the testator was motivated by
mere caprice, the [restriction] is likely to be unenforceable").
132 See Shapira v. Nat'l Union Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ohio Misc. 1974) (distinguishing between
the court being asked restrict an individual's freedom to marry as compared to being asked to enforce the
testator's restriction upon his devisee's inheritance).
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on freedom of religion or speech grounds also fails by the reasoning of some
courts'. The Snodgrass court initially explained freedom of religion as:
[tihe right to espouse any religious faith or any political cause short of
one dedicated to the overthrow of the government by force carries
with it the cognate right to engage as its champion in the
proselytization of followers or converts to the favored cause or faith.
To that end its disciples are free to emphasize and teach what is
believed by them to be its superior and self-evident truths and to point
out and warn others against what its votaries deem to be the inferior,
fallacious or dangerous philosophical content of opposing faiths or
doctrines.'
33
Since marriage is often closely linked with religion, restrictions upon it
necessarily cause ethical dilemmas. Although a certain person or group of
people may be excluded based on a testator's religious prejudice, this prejudice
represents her belief system, no matter how obscure or non-mainstream.134 Even
so, the testator is imposing his religious views upon his daughter or son. In
Snodgrass, at the time the will was written, the daughter was merely ten years
old-not nearly old enough to formulate her own opinions and personal
preferences, especially those concerning a marriage partner.135 The fact that this
testator would coerce and compel a young child into his way of thinking shows,
or at least raises the possibility, that the daughter may not have chosen the same
path on her own. Restricting an heir this way is essentially interfering with the
heir's "liberty of conscience." 136  Like one's choice of religion, "liberty of
conscience" may be construed to apply to the choice of spouse.
It appears that in cases concerning marriage restrictions, courts are
simply content to on rely on precedent. In Snodgrass, for example, the court
observes that "it has long been a firmly-established policy in Oregon to give
great latitude to a testator in the final disposition of his estate, notwithstanding
that the right is not an inherent, natural or constitutional right but is purely a
creation of statute and within legislative control." 3 7 Laws have evolved greatly
133 U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863-64 (Or. 1954).
134 See id. at 863 ("It is not until actions motivated by the intolerant extremes of bigotry contravene the
positive law or invade the boundaries of established public policy that the law is quickened to repress such
illegal excesses and in proper cases levy toll upon the offenders as reparation to those who have been damaged
thereby.").
135 See id. at 861 (describing the facts of the case).
136 See PAGE, supra note 29, § 44.28 (explaining that some jurisdictions have found conditions
restricting an individual's religion invalid and contrary to public policy as "interfering with the liberty of
conscience").
137 See Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 865 (relying on the precedential value of In re Leet's Estate, 206 P. 548
(Or. 1922)); see also Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that
"the taking of property by inheritance or will is not an absolute or natural right but one created by the laws of the
14 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 2 (2008)
within the last one hundred and fifty years, particularly concerning various
ethnicities. Looking at historical accounts of what marital restrictions have and
have not been enforced, then, is not warranted.
VI. Marital Restrictions Should Be Held as In Terrorem Per Se "Making a
will is an exercise of power without responsibility. "'38
This section looks critically at the intent of the testator, comparing the in
terrorem139 clause to the non-in terrorem clause and concluding that the validity
of the restrictive devise should not depend on its construction. Indeed, this Note
proposes that all marriage restrictions should be considered in terrorem and thus
held void. This section shall draw a further parallel between coercive behavior
that has voided testamentary devises and those restrictive devises that wrongly
emulate coercive behavior and have been upheld.
The courts will uphold a restriction of partial character14° where it is
both reasonable in itself and does not operate purely in terrorem.14 1 The "in
terrorem" rule was derived from the civil law and is defined as a condition
subsequent which is against "public policy, public decency or good manners will
be treated as in terrorem and void unless there is a specific devise over" (e.g., a
'gift over'). 42  A clause that is said to be operating in terrorem, is one that
sovereign power.... [T]he state may foreclose the right absolutely, or it may grant the right upon conditions
precedent").
138 See Hirsch & Wang, infra note 161, at 13 (citing M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 JURID.
REv. 172, 173) (discussing dead-hand restrictions and proposing that lawmakers consider not only how long a
testator effectively control property, but in what ways that testator proposes to control the property).
139 Courts have generally not favored in terrorem clauses and have construed these clauses strictly in
order to prevent forfeitures of a testator's property. See DiMaria v. Silvester, 89 F. Supp. 2d 195, 199 (D.
Conn. 1999) (stating that although recognized as valid in principle, an 'in terrorem' clause is not favored by the
courts and is to be narrowly construed in order to prevent forfeitures). An in terrorem clause is a "provision
designed to threaten one into action or inaction; esp., a testamentary provision that threatens to dispossess any
beneficiary who challenges the terms of the will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1073 (8th ed. 2004).
140 See Turner v. Evans, 106 A. 617,617 (Md. 1919) (finding that partial limitation of marriage is valid
unless it unreasonably limits the right of the beneficiary to marry).
141 See Watts v. Griffin 50 S.E. 218, 218 (N.C. 1905) (holding that a clause in testator's will providing
that should the testator's "sons, Frank, Eugene and Sam, at any time marry common women, or if either of them
marry a common woman, then in such event they shall not have any interest in the house and lot devised in
paragraph first of this will," is void for uncertainty); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003)
("[A]lthough one is free to give property to another or to withhold it, it does not follow that one may give in
trust with whatever terms or conditions one may wish to attach. This is particularly so of provisions that the law
views as exerting a socially undesirable influence .. "); In re Coleman's Estate, 317 A.2d 631,633-34 (Pa.
1974) (declaring void a provision prohibiting persons married to non-Protestants from being appointed as
trustees as a provision that overburdens the judicial system and merely reflects a settler's "personal vagaries"
unrelated to the trust purpose).
142 In re Alexander's Estate, 19 A.2d 374, 375 (1941) (quoting In re Carr's Estate, 22 A. 18 (Pa.
1890)). Provisions against marriage and against contest of the will are the conditions to which the rule is most
frequently applied. The rule does not extend to conditions precedent. See generally In re Estate of Wells, 983
P.2d 279 (Kan. App. 1999); In re Estate of Hamill, 866 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App. 1993); In re Estate of Peppler,
971 P.2d 694 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
'TILL [MY PARENTS'] DEATH Do US PART
operates to discourage, intimidate, and terrorize one into doing what one might
not do otherwise. 143  This clause will be sustained where the will especially
directs that the share of the person violating the condition shall be added to the
residuary gift.144 The mere absence of such a gift-over suggests the in terrorem
mode of the gift. 145 A testator's failure to give the devise to another if the heir
fails to comport with the restriction is viewed as spiteful and void. What will be
viewed as spiteful, malevolent, or even capricious may depend on whether the
testator includes a gift of the restricted property to another for their enjoyment.
In Maddox v. Maddox,146 the testator, a member of the Society of
Friends, 147 devised to his niece the remainder after a life interest, "during her
single life, and forever, if her conduct should be orderly, and she remain a
member of the Society of Friends." 48 When the niece became of age, there were
only "five or six unmarried men of the Society in the neighborhood in which she
lived."' 49 When she subsequently married a man who was not a member of the
Society of Friends, she ceased to be a member of the Society and thus forfeited
her rights to the remainder interest.150 According to Shapira,15' the court should
have enforced the marital restriction because she failed to follow the terms of the
devise; however, in Maddox, the devise was void for unreasonableness.1 52 The
court found it unreasonable that a woman would be forced to choose a spouse
from only six candidates and implying that one should not be forced to look
beyond one's surrounding neighborhood. 53 This holding clearly shows that the
court is taking the totality of the circumstances into account in direct conflict
with Shapira. 
154
143 In general, gifts that are given on condition subsequent, gifts that inspire fear or dread, have been
termed by courts as in terrorem gifts. See In re Andrus' Will, 281 N.Y.S. 831, 845 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ("What
makes them in terrorem in character is the fact that the legacy becomes null and void if the legatee fails to
observe the condition and there is a gift over to persons other than through the residuary clause."). The court
went on to state: "It is a method of bringing pressure to induce the surrender of something. It is termed the
doctrine of in terrorem." Id.
I" Id. (determining that clauses are in terrorem if the gift over is by a means "other than through the
residuary clause").
145 See Broach v. Hester, 121 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. 1961) (stating that a general gift ofthe residue, or a
gift over to the testator's estate, is not a gift over but is still subject to being considered in terrorem).
146 Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. 804 (1854).
147 See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the Society of Friends).
148 Maddox, 52 Va. at 804.
149 Id.
15O Id. ("[B]y that act she ceased to be a member of the society.").
151 Shapira v. Nat'l Union Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Com. P1. 1974).
152 Maddox, 52 Va. 804 ("[T]he condition imposed by the bequest of the third in remainder to Ann
Maria Maddox, which in effect forbade her to many any other than a member of the Society of Friends, was an
undue and unreasonable restraint upon the choice of marriage, and ought to be disregarded.").
153 Id. ("To say there were members of the society residing in other counties, is no answer to the
objection.").
154 Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831 (deciding not to take into account the population of available Jewish
women or the fact that the testator's son could look for a potential spouse outside his community).
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The court in Taylor v. Rapp155 did not consider the testator's devise in
terrorem because of a clear gift-over to the younger daughter, Jeannette Rapp. 1
56
The devise provided for a:
'remainder... to my two daughters, NANNETTE and JEANNETTE
RAPP, in equal parts, share and share alike. However, if my oldest
daughter does marry JODY TAYLOR, a boy I do not like and care
for in any respects; said daughter NANNETTE RAPP does not share
in any respects with my youngest daughter JEANNETTE RAPP." 57
was found not to operate. Had the gift to the other sister not been made, the
clause presumably would be held null and void as operating in terrorem. The
testator has the freedom to dispose of his property; however, the doctrine of in
terrorem was clearly designed to catch malicious intent. By restricting gifts this
way, the testator intimidates and discourages an heir into thinking that she is not
competent to make her own decisions regarding her marital future. Even with
such a gift over, however, it cannot be considered good or decent to dictate the
color or ethnicity of a relative's future mate.
The simple insertion of this "gift-over clause" should not prevent an heir
from taking under the will. In the Taylor example, the father's apparent dislike
for a probable suitor or acquaintance of his daughter clearly is the reason behind
his forbidding marriage between the two. However, the father is only
prohibiting marriage to one individual, not an entire ethnic or racial group. The
testator's intent to influence and coerce an heir into the testator's moral belief
system does not change simply by adding the gift over provision. Undoubtedly,
if "a Mexican" or "an Arab" replaced the name "Jody Taylor" in the example
above, more eyebrows would rise and the testator's bigotry would shine through,
regardless of the presence of a gift-over clause.
Conditioning spousal choice though bribery and heavy inducement of a
testamentary gift is barely better than coercion, if at all. In general, coercion is
defined as "conduct that constitutes the improper use of economic power to
compel another to submit to the wishes to one who yields it.' 58 In the laws of
probate, a will itself is declared invalid if it is found that the testator had "any
pressure upon the testator' s mind, which overpowers it.... The fact that it is not
physical coercion is sometimes indicated by calling it moral coercion." 159 Simply
155 124 S.E.2d 271 (Ga. 1962).
156 Id. ("Even if the clause were an in terrorem clause, such clauses are valid in this state so long as
there is a limitation over to some other person and so long as the condition imposed is not impossible, illegal, or
against public policy.").
I5 d. at 272.
158 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
159 PAGE, supra note 29, § 15.2, 815-16; see also Koppal v. Soules, 189 Md. 346, 350 (1947)
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because a testator subsequently adds a gift over clause to one that otherwise
would be considered in terrorem, does not side-step the reality that the testator's
intent is coercion or at best, influence over the lives of those which the testator
has no legal control and should have no influence. The testator no doubt realizes
this and so attaches incentive for the devisee to adopt the testator's way of
thinking or effectuate the testator's wishes. This is, in essence, coercion. The
testator has no interest in another's marriage, or the lives of the living in general,
since he is dead and derives no benefit one way or another. 160 They are reluctant
to look outside the document to give property to a rightful heir who may have
married wrongly in the testator's eyes; by the same token, the court indirectly
endorses a testator's intolerance, and often-prejudicial attitudes. 161 Instead,
courts defer to the testator's concept of "reasonableness," discussed above. One
must ask whether if it is truly right to bully or coerce another into one's own way
of thinking?
Although these restrictions may not operate as legally in terrorem,
suffice it to say that perpetuating the terrifying motive of bigotry is certainly the
intended outcome of these restricted dispositions and should not play any part in
the choices one makes for a mate. Forbidding a marriage to one, or any class of
persons for that matter, should per se be considered in terrorem.
In reality, to avoid such restrictions testators may be inclined to
disinherit their children completely (that is, those who put their own ideals
before their blood). It is also possible, however, that the temperature of the
testators would generally change and testators may become more sympathetic to
a devisee's matrimonial decision. Then again, it is possible to draw up a will
restricting devises on other legal characteristics. Though this last alternative may
not completely solve issues of a discriminatory motive on the part of the testator,
it would keep the devises legal and outwardly less controversial.
VII. Conclusion
My strongest convictions as to the future of the negro race therefore
is, that his will not be expatriated nor annihilated, nor will he
(discussing moral coercion); In re Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 436 (1930) (holding that in the absence of lack of
testamentary capacity, the evidence must be clear and strong to show undue influence).
160 In fact this may be the case. The testator's thought process may lead him to devise his property in
such a way as to effect his most desirable wishes, if he cannot effectuate those, he may opt to give his property
to another who he believes is more apt to share his moral values in that respect or other secondary concerns.
161 There is a lot to be said for this type of approach; production of evidence can be a very tedious,
lengthy and strenuous process. There is also a great chance of fraud. However, in these circumstances, there is
a compelling argument against allowing the dead hand to enter a marital relationship. See generally Drennan,
supra note 127; Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. U. 1,
6-14 (1992).
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forever remain a separate and distinct race from the people around
him, but that he will be absorbed, assimilated and it will only
appear finally ... in the features of a blended race.'
62
The courts have been wrongly upholding marital restrictions based on
race and ethnicity. Race may be certain but is certainly not a reasonable
restriction to impose on devisees. Moreover, the courts have looked beyond the
face of the document where a devisee may be slighted into the intent of the
devise and voided those sections which yield an unpleasant outcome. Further,
these ethnic and race conscious devises should be held in terrorem as coercive
tactics despite the gift over, due to the fact that the malicious intent is apparent
with or without the gift-over clause. Allowing these ethnic and albeit partial
marital restrictions only perpetuates racially divided attitudes.
There are many personal reasons for a testator to want to limit an heir's
choices of spouse, but the courts fail to address a testator' s motive (for the most
part) despite the belief that motive fuels intent. 163 Ultimately, a testator must
decide for himself when drawing a will if the heir's happiness is worth
sacrificing for one's own selfish prejudices. The country, much less the world,
becomes a better, more forward thinking, tolerant place without the in terrorem
spousal restrictions imposed by the dead. To completely eradicate
discrimination, the freedom to marry needs to continue at death.
Though most agree with the fact that one should be able to dispose of his
private property as he likes, such restrictions severely restrict the enjoyment of
the property being disposed of by those the testator clearly considers eligible to
own it. In effect, the testator is placing his ideal before the person to whom he
wishes to devise his property and creating uncomfortable situations in the
process. Because the power to devise is given by statute, states retain the power
to amend and enact legislation to overcome the discriminatory intent of testators
in devising their property. Therefore, this Note urges states to reconsider letting
the dead dictate to their heirs with whom they can spend the rest of their lives.
162 SPIKARD, supra note 9, at 297 (citing Frederick Douglass).
163 JOHN H. WIGGAMoRE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 76 (1935) (stating that,
"[tihe term 'motive' is unfortunately ambiguous [to that of intent]. That feeling which internally urges or
pushed a person to do or refrain from doing an act is an emotion, and is of course evidential towards his doing
or not doing the act").
